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9.1    Introduction
If physical capital—its growth and distribution—was central to debates 
on economic development in the twentieth century, human capital increas-
ingly occupies center stage (Kapur and Crowley 2008). While much of the 
attention has been on primary education, tertiary education is increasingly 
receiving greater attention. However, the very promise of higher education 
for developing countries is also making this a politically contentious issue. 
Because universities inﬂ  uence the minds of young adults, they have always 
been sites of politics. Increasingly, however, a growing awareness of the 
distributional implications of higher education has led to issues of access 
and ﬁ  nancing becoming more salient (often at the expense of quality). Many 
of the underlying handicaps faced by students from lower socioeconomic 
groups appear to occur much earlier in the life cycle—at the primary and 
secondary school level—but policies to overcome these handicaps seem to 
be more politically expeditious in higher education. Unsurprisingly, the 
attention to higher education in developing countries has focused mainly 
on its economic eﬀects, especially its links with labor markets. However, 
there is little understanding about the how the impact of higher education 
is mediated by the type of education and its beneﬁ  ciaries.
The paper ﬁ  rst outlines the principal characteristics of Indian higher edu-
cation and its recent rapid growth, especially the number of students and 
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institutions, the ﬁ  elds of study, and the sources of supply. The next section 
focuses on the key challenges facing Indian higher education resulting from 
a massive increase in the demand for higher education. What are the speciﬁ  c 
ﬁ  elds of higher education for this growing demand, and how is it being met? 
It then analyzes two key questions: why, despite India’s robust growth and 
a legacy of one of the better higher education systems in developing coun-
tries, has quality deteriorated so markedly? And, second, if quality is indeed 
poor, then why is this not manifestly handicapping India’s rapid growth? It 
concludes with some questions on possible nonlabor market eﬀects of the 
current structure of Indian higher education.
9.2    Growth
The past quarter century has seen a massive expansion in higher educa-
tion worldwide and especially in developing countries, reﬂ  ecting shifting 
demographics, changing economic structures, and signiﬁ  cant improvements 
in access to primary and secondary education. Tertiary education is a rapidly 
growing service sector, enrolling more than 80 million students worldwide 
and employing about 3.5 million people. Demand pressures have been acute, 
the result of a population bulge in the relevant age group, increasing enroll-
ment in secondary education, increasing incomes (and with it the capacity 
to pay), and rising wage premiums accruing from higher education. Meeting 
this escalating demand has placed public systems and resources under severe 
strain. And because this demand group is more urban and vocal, it also poses 
major political challenges.
As countries and university systems strain under the pressure of increas-
ing demand, new supply responses are rapidly changing the higher educa-
tion landscape in most countries. The ﬁ  nancing, provision, and regulation 
of higher education are witnessing two major shifts. The ﬁ  rst is from pure 
public to private and mixed systems; the second is a shift from provision 
and regulation that has traditionally been purely domestic to greater inter-
national inﬂ  uence. These trends broadly mimic what has been occurring 
in almost all aspects of the economy. This is true in India as well—but, if 
anything, the trend toward the private provision of higher education is even 
greater.
9.2.1      Indian Higher Education: Basic Facts and Trends
In 1950 to 1951 India had twenty-  seven universities, which included 370 
colleges for general education and 208 colleges for professional education 
(engineering, medicine, education). The system has grown rapidly, especially 
since the mid-  1980s, with student enrollment growing at about 5 percent 
annually over the past two decades. This growth is about two- and- half times 
the population growth rate and results from both a population bulge in lower 
age cohorts as well as increased demand for higher education. The gross Indian Higher Education    3 0 7
enrollment ratio in higher education is approximately 11 percent of the age 
cohort with women constituting about 40 percent of enrollments.
By end 2008, India had 449 universities—265 state universities, 25 central 
universities, 121 deemed-  to-  be universities (also known as “deemed uni-
versities”), 33 institutes of national importance established under Central 
Legislation and 5 institutions established under legislations by various state 
legislations.1 In addition, there were 22,064 colleges. At the beginning of 
the academic year 2008 to 2009, the total number of students enrolled in 
universities and colleges was about 12.4 million. Of this 1.6 million (13 per-
cent) were enrolled in university departments and 10.8 million (87 percent) 
in aﬃliated colleges. Women comprised 40.5 percent of total enrolment.
The number of doctoral degrees awarded by various universities in 2006 
was 20,131. Out of the total number of doctoral degrees awarded, faculties 
of arts had the highest proportion followed by the faculties of science. These 
two faculties together accounted for over 70 percent of the total number of 
doctoral degree awarded. In contrast, the number of engineering PhDs is 
about a thousand—less than one per engineering college. The number of 
faculty was about half million, of which 16 percent was in universities and 
the rest in the aﬃliated teaching colleges.
The bulk of students (nearly two-  thirds) are enrolled in arts and science, 
with another one- sixth in commerce/ management. Recent growth has been 
much greater in technical education (engineering, management, pharmacy) 
and professional education (medicine, teacher training, and law), as well as 
in private vocational courses catering especially to the information tech-
nology (IT) sector (table 9.1). The private sector has accounted for the bulk 
of recent supply as cash-  strapped state governments have virtually ceased 
to expand the list of government aided institutions, thereby increasing the 
percentage of “self- ﬁ  nanced” or “private unaided institutions,” most notice-
ably in professional and technical education (Agarwal 2006; Kapur and 
Mehta 2007). The vast majority of these, however, are aﬃliated to public 
universities whose role is increasingly an aﬃliation and degree granting one 
rather than teaching or research. Consequently, enrollment at public uni-
versities is still almost a hundred fold that of private universities, principally 
because of onerous entry regulations on the latter.
These private institutions are helping to meet the growing demand that 
the public sector cannot. Private institutions are less subject to political 
instabilities and day-  to-  day political pressures that often bedevil public 
institutions in developing countries. They are also more nimble and able 
to respond to changes in demands from employers and labor markets. 
Yet despite these positives, these institutions are of highly variable—and 
1. Deemed- to- be- universities are an institutional innovation that may be sui generis to India. 
These institutions have narrow domains but can grant degrees. The original criterion was that 
they should be engaged in research and teaching in chosen ﬁ  elds of specialization that were 
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often dubious—quality. They are mostly teaching shops, and very rarely 
knowledge- producing institutions. Although most private provision occurs 
domestically, there is a small but growing trend toward international private 
provision.
The public-  sector supply, which has been stagnant since the early 1980s, 
is, however, poised for signiﬁ  cant expansion if the targets announced for 
the XI plan (2007–2008 to 2011–2012) come to pass. It has targeted a gross 
enrollment ratio (GER) of 15 percent (21 million students), implying an 
annual growth rate of nearly 9 percent or an additional enrolment of 870,000 
students in universities and about 6 million in colleges in the next ﬁ  ve years. 
To this end, the central government intends setting up and funding thirty 
new central universities across the country, has ambitious plans in “technical 
education,” and intends supporting state governments to set up colleges in 
the 340 districts that have extremely low college enrolments.2 In December 
2008, the Indian parliament passed a bill establishing a science and engineer-
ing research board (SERB) to serve as the apex research agency for planning 
and supporting research. Ideally, such a body would identify research priori-
ties and then fund researchers (and their institutions) through a competitive 
grant process. A host of funding initiatives has also been announced that 
follow the student instead of the institution.3 By providing merit scholar-
ships to 2 percent of total students in higher education, the government 
hopes that universities will have an incentive to compete and attract students 
Table 9.1  Higher education in India: technical education intake capacity
    No. of students   No. of Institutions
Engineering (degree) 627,082 1,617
Engineering (diploma) 333,296 1,403
Business Management 104,084 1,150
Master’s in Computer Applications 56,004 999
Hotel Management and Catering Technology 5,229 80
Pharmacy 44,476 736
Architecture 4,707 116
Fine Arts   650   9
Source: Government of India, Ministry of Human Resource Development. Data are from 
July 31, 2007.
2. This includes setting up eight (new) India institutes of technology (IITs), seven India 
institutes of management (IIMs), ﬁ  ve India institutes of science and engineering research (IIS-
ERs), two schools of planning and architecture (SPAs), ten national institutes of technology 
(NITs), twenty India institutes of information technology (IIITs), and ﬁ  fty centers for training 
and research in frontier areas.
3. Schemes under the Innovation in Science Pursuit for Inspired Research (INSPIRE) 
launched in XI Plan include (a) Scheme for Early Attraction of Talents for Science (SEATS), 
(b) Scholarships for Higher Education (SHE), (c) Assured Opportunity for Research Careers 
(AORC).Indian Higher Education    3 0 9
rather than have all their costs covered. And in order to increase the pool 
from which universities will be able to draw students, in late 2008, the Indian 
government announced a new $5 billion program to boost secondary school 
enrolment from just above half to 75 percent within ﬁ  ve years.4
9.3    Quality
The prevailing view regarding higher education in India is discouraging: 
by most quality indicators, Indian bachelor’s, master’s, and PhD programs 
are lagging behind domestic demand in terms of required quality of gradu-
ates. There are numerous studies that detail both the need for better higher 
education in the country and the challenges in recruiting a scientiﬁ  cally 
competent workforce. According to the prime minister, the Indian univer-
sity system “is, in many parts, in a state of disrepair . . . In almost half the 
districts [340] in the country, higher education enrolments are abysmally 
low, almost two-  third of our universities and 90 per cent of our colleges 
are rated as below average on quality parameters . . . Its erstwhile Human 
Resources Development (HRD) Minister (who is responsible for higher edu-
cation), called higher education the ‘sick child of education.’5
Various indicators employed to study the quality of higher education in 
India, such as research output, infrastructure, and placement of graduates, 
point to the need for reform in the higher education public and private sec-
tor. In the Times Higher Education World University Rankings 2008, of the 
top 200 universities, two were Indian: the Indian Institute of Technology, 
Delhi, and the Indian Institute of Technology, Bombay.6 And the Academic 
Rankings of World Universities by Shanghai Jiao Tong University ranked 
only two Indian universities in the top 500 (Indian Institute of Technology, 
Kharagpur and the Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore, both between 303 
and 401).7 Note that even the handful included in these rankings is domi-
nated by engineering-   and technology-  speciﬁ  c institutions, a sorry testa-
ment to the extreme weakness of broad-  based universities in the country.
In science and engineering, the part of Indian higher education that has 
grown most rapidly in recent years, India produced three times more gradu-
ates than the United States in 2006 (table 9.2). Various industry surveys 
4. The program called the Rashtriya Madhyamik Shiksha Abhiyan aims at providing addi-
tional enrollment of 3.2 million through strengthening of about 44,000 secondary schools and 
opening 11,188 new secondary schools and appointment of 179,000 additional teachers and 
construction of 88,500 classrooms.
5. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s address at the 150th Anniversary Function of Univer-
sity of Mumbai, June 22, 2007, http:/  /  pmindia.nic.in/  lspeech.asp?id555; Arjun Singh, cited 
in  http:/ / inhome.rediﬀ.com/ news/ 2007/ oct/ 10arjun.htm.
6. Data available at http:/  /  www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/  hybrid.asp?typeCode243&
pubCode1.
7. Data available at http:/  /  www.arwu.org/  rank2008/  EN2008.htm.310    Devesh  Kapur
indicate that about a ﬁ  fth of these are of comparable standards to their U.S. 
counterparts. The contrast is most stark in the number of PhDs. Between 
1985 and 2002, the ratio of the number of PhDs to bachelors degrees in 
India dropped from 2.2 percent to just 0.66 percent, while it doubled in the 
United States from 4.1 percent to 8.4 percent (table 9.3). The annual num-
ber of PhD engineers produced in India around 2005 was about half per 
engineering school per year.
The contrast with China is stark. In the last two decades, the number of 
PhDs in science and engineering (S&E) in India increased by around 50 
percent (from 4,007 in 1985 to 6,318 in 2003), whereas in China, the numbers 
increased from a tiny 125 in 1985 to 12,238 in 2003 and 14,858 in 2004 (see 
ﬁ  gure 9.1). According to one analysis, in 1990, publications from India were 
about 50 percent more than China. Over the next ﬁ  fteen years, publications 
from India increased 40 percent. The increase from China was nearly sixfold, 
a number more than double compared to India (see ﬁ  gure 9.2).
The problems are even more acute in the social sciences. The number of 
PhDs produced by India’s premier economics faculty—Delhi School of 
Economics—has dropped from about 4.5 a year in the 1970s and 1990s to 
barely 1.5 a year in this decade. This is despite the fact that the number of 
economics departments in Indian universities grew from 72 in 1971 to 119 
in 2001. As a recent oﬃcial review of Indian social sciences put it, “an even 
more serious problem [than funding] is the severe, and increasing, shortage, 
of qualiﬁ  ed researchers. Even research institutes and universities that have 
Table 9.2  Science and engineering higher education in China, India, and the United 
States







Bachelors 237,000 351,500 74,200
Masters 20,000 35,000 39,000
Doctorates
  Science 5,500 32,000 14,200
  Engineering 1,000 4,300 8,400
  Total 6,500 36,300 22,600
  Masters/Bachelors  (%) 8.4 10 52.6
  Doctorates/Bachelors  (%) 0.4 1.2 11.3
Bachelors per million population 214 272 246
No. of institutions 1,511 n.a. 4,314a
Faculty 67,000 n.a. 26,700
Publications in science and engineering (2003)   12,774   60,067   211,233
Sources: Banerjee and Muley (2007). For China, data taken from Vivek Wadhwa, Duke Out-
sourcing Study: Empirical Comparison of Engineering Graduates in the U.S., China, and 
India, 2005.
Notes: Data are from most recent year available.
aTaken from http://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/2008/analysis/sa_table.asp?tableID1053.Table 9.3  Ratio of engineering PhDs to bachelors engineering degrees
    1985   1987   1989   1991   1993   1995   1997   1999   2000   2001   2002
India 2.21 2.13 2.03 n.a. n.a. 0.58 0.4 0.93 0.87 0.83 0.66
China 0.09 0.15 0.65 0.67 0.88 1.11 1.51 1.67 2.11 1.98 n.a.
United States   4.08   4.99   6.79   8.38   9.09   9.48   9.81   n.a.   8.94   9.28   8.36
Source: Banerjee and Muley (2007), “Engineering Education in India,” Observer Research Foundation 
Report. Data from tables 1.10, 1.11 and 1.12.
Fig. 9.1    Science and engineering doctoral degrees: Selected years, 1985–  2005
Source: NSF, Science and engineering indicators, 2008, appendix table 2-  43.312    Devesh  Kapur
a good reputation for quality are faced with a decline in both the number 
and quality of Ph.D. students.”8
The shortage of faculty is ubiquitous across ﬁ  elds. According to a sur-
vey by the Pay Review Commission of the University Grants Commission, 
44.6 percent of sanction positions of lecturers at the university level and 
41 percent at the college level were vacant.9 In December 2008, the Indian 
government approved a pay hike of 70 percent for the nearly half a million 
faculty in universities and colleges across India. However, while this mea-
sure will help, it does not address the core questions of governance, which is 
the central reason for the weaknesses of Indian higher education and even 
more of a deterrent to attracting talent.
The poor quality of Indian higher education is evident in the results of the 
Indian administrative service exams. The applicants to posts ratio (APR), 
an index of the number of candidates aspiring for civil service posts through 
various examinations is an astounding 755 candidates for every post ﬁ  lled 
(for 2005). Even then, suitable candidates are not found, and positions are 
left unﬁ  lled (table 9.4). More than 5,000 candidates applied for just thirty 
positions for the Indian Economic Service/ Indian Statistical Service through 
civil services examinations. Even then, barely twenty-  three made the grade. 
Fig. 9.2    Publication productivity of India and China
Source: Kademani, Sagar, and Kumar (2006).
8. The Indian Council of Social Science Research, “Restructuring the Indian Council of 
Social Science Research,” Report of the Fourth Review Committee, March 2007, 22.
9. University Grants Commission, Report of the Committee to Review the Pay Scales and 
Service Conditions of University and College Teachers, 2008.Indian Higher Education    3 1 3
It should be noted that this is a diﬀerent problem from the disincentives to 
join the public sector because of (relatively) poor pay or working conditions, 
which might result in fewer applications and lead the best to leave after a 
few years. There are clearly a very large number of students with degrees in 
economics and statistics who want to apply—it is just that less than half of 
1 percent conform to certain standards. The result is that the Indian Statis-
tical Service, a cadre of the federal government that over the decades has 
produced one of the best government statistics among developing countries, 
is being starved of talent with adverse consequences for the quality of gov-
ernment statistics. Indian newspaper editors, when queried about the main 
constraint facing them, say it is the lack of availability of young people who 
can write even two pages of correct English prose.
9.4      The Political Economy of Indian Higher 
Education: Why Is Quality Poor?
There are several reasons why Indian higher education, and the bulk of its 
universities in particular, is in a poor state. A structural reason stems from 
a decision made in the 1950s to create separate research institutions outside 
the university system. Over time, as universities became politicized, research-
ers ﬂ  ed the university system and migrated to public institutions under the 
umbrella of the Council of Scientiﬁ  c and Industrial Research (CSIR), the 
Department of Atomic Energy, the Indian Space Research Organization, 
and the Indian Council of Social Science Research (ICSSR). The bifurcation 
of research from teaching and the in-  breeding of faculty, gradually led to 
an entrenchment of mediocrity. The most acute weakness plaguing India’s 
higher education system is a crisis of governance. Indeed the Indian Prime 
Minister, a former professor at Delhi University, himself has commented, 
Table 9.4  Indian civil service exams







candidates   APR   RPR
Civil Services 457 345,106 425 755 0.93
Engineering Services 262 74,363 229 284 0.87
Combined Medical Services 624 28,878 562 46 0.90
Central Police Forces 256 92,568 224 362 0.88
Indian Economic Service/
  Indian Statistical Service
30 5,017 23 167 0.77
Geologists 95 3,433 95 36 1.00
Total   1,724   549,365   1,558   319   0.90
Source: Union Public Service Commission 57th Annual Report, 2006–07, table 5.
Note: APR  applicants to posts ratio; RPR  recommended to post ratio.314    Devesh  Kapur
“I am concerned that in many states university appointments, including that 
of vice-  chancellors, have been politicised and have become subject to caste 
and communal considerations, there are complaints of favouritism and cor-
ruption.” The core of the governance problem lies in the nature of highly 
centralized state regulation of higher education that seeks to micro- manage 
who can teach what to whom at what cost. Table 9.5 gives an overview of 
the regulatory structure of Indian higher education. Its eﬀects on Indian 
higher education can be gauged by the bleak assessment of a former science 
and technology (S&T) minster, “There is not such a thing as UGC [Uni-
versity Grants Commission] there is not such a thing as AICTE [All India 
Council for Technical Education], there is not such a thing as MCI (in the 
western world). They [have] destroyed our entire eﬀorts to take education 
forward.”10
One might presume that an independent regulatory framework for any 
sector would shield it from the political interference. In the Indian case, they 
are simply another mechanism for political inﬂ  uence and rent- seeking. And 
when they do exercise regulatory independence, they are quickly overridden 
by the ministries even ﬂ  outing the courts. To take one example: in 2003, the 
Supreme Court of India ruled that the Medical Council of India (MCI) was 
the only authority that could recommend an increase of student strength 
or renewal of permission for medical colleges. That order had directed the 
central government “not to grant any further permission without following 
the procedure prescribed under the Indian Medical Council Act.” In 2008, 
the MCI denied permission to two medical colleges to take new students 
based on a report by a government appointed lawyer that their facilities were 
“inadequate.”11 The very same day the Health Ministry permitted the very 
two private medical colleges to take in more students!
There is suﬃcient awareness of the problems aﬄicting Indian higher edu-
cation at the highest levels of the Indian government as evident by the quotes 
cited in the preceding by a range of key cabinet members. Why then has the 
Indian state not acted and addressed them? One reason may be that higher 
education is arguably one of the most diﬃcult sectors to reform—and not 
just in India. In the case of public universities, employees (both faculty and 
administration) and students are among the most vocal and well- organized 
political groups in any country. Even as unions have weakened in virtu-
ally all aspects of economic activity, education remains a rare exception. 
Direct exit options—such as closing down poor performing departments or 
10. Kapil Sibal, quoted in Business Standard July 9, 2008, http:/  /  www.business-  standard
.com/ india/ storypage.php?autono328167. In April 2009, Kapil Sibal became the new minister 
for Human Resource Development, which included higher education.
11. Amitav Ranjan, “Denied SC nod for admissions, 2 medical colleges get Health Minis-
try OK same day,” Indian Express, September 29, 2008, http:/  /  www.indianexpress.com/  news/
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colleges—sharply increases the risks of an immediate political reaction. Vis-
ible strategies such as increasing fees are also ﬁ  ercely resisted even when they 
could raise quality or lead to a less regressive income transfer to elites.
Public universities (and their aﬃliated colleges) are plagued by misguided 
attempts at equity, poor administration, and bureaucratization. The lack 
of institutional autonomy and poor academic governance has made it 
increasingly diﬃcult for higher education to attract talent, especially because 
(unlike the past) that talent has alternatives. In many cases, talent out has 
been driven out, and as individuals at the upper end of human capital distri-
bution leave, the remaining pool is of poorer quality. This not only prompts 
the more talented to also consider leaving, but also discourages those who 
left earlier from returning, ensuring that mediocrity becomes entrenched in 
these institutions. While low salaries are an issue, in many cases, a poor over-
all academic environment is perhaps more important. In most government 
institutions, the focus is on process rather than performance, appointments 
are politicized, and autonomy in administration, ﬁ  nancial, and academic 
content is minimal. Resources are an undoubted constraint, but more ﬂ  ex-
ible rules, access to modest research resources, and a work environment that 
encourages innovative practices and research can achieve much.
Consequently, changes have occurred largely because the majority of 
public institutions focus on liberal arts programs, which have deteriorated 
to such an extent as to force students to seek private-  sector alternatives. In 
other cases, ﬁ  scal constraints have limited public- sector led supply increases, 
resulting in increasing rationing as demand escalates, thereby forcing excess 
demand to spill over to a burgeoning private sector. The latter largely focus 
on technical and professional education and, as I note later, are also plagued 
by poor quality and corrupt practices. In both cases, the result is the same—
a massive increase in the share of the private sector in higher education.
A second reason for the problems aﬄicting the Indian university system 
is the rent-  seeking behavior that is the inevitable consequence of detailed 
administrative regulation. The sector is the last refuge of the “license raj” 
with severe political, administrative, and regulatory interference on virtu-
ally every aspect of higher education, be it admissions policies, internal 
organization, fees and salaries, and the structure of courses and funding.12 
While the private sector has ramped up supply, the quality of most of the 
new private-  sector colleges (many linked to politicians) leaves much to be 
desired. Their governance problems may be diﬀerent from public institu-
tions, but are no less acute. As a recent report by a commission appointed by 
12. Prior to the onset of economic liberalization in India in 1991, ﬁ  rms were required to seek 
government approval for what they produced, how much they produced, what technologies 
they could use, and the sources of ﬁ  nancing. Tight quantitative restrictions on imports were 
enforced through import licenses. The system, whose original logic lay in a planned economy, 
degenerated into a labyrinth of red tape and rent seeking by state functionaries and businesses, 
and came to be known as the “license raj.”Indian Higher Education    3 1 7
the Indian government put it, “mushrooming engineering and management 
colleges, with some notable exceptions, have largely become, mere business 
entities dispensing very poor quality education.”13
Ironically, at the same time, the Indian state has made it very diﬃcult for 
quality private universities to come up, jeopardizing the supply of faculty—
and the training of future generations.14 First, the process of regulatory 
approvals diminishes the capacity of private investment to respond to market 
needs. Second, the regulatory process produces an adverse selection in the 
kind of entrepreneurs that invest because the success of a project depends 
less upon the pedagogic design of the project than the ability to manipulate 
the regulatory system. Consequently, private investment in higher education 
is driven principally by proﬁ  t making goals and not education as a public 
trust. Consequently, private-  sector investment has been conﬁ  ned to profes-
sional streams, bypassing the majority of students, and also suﬀers severe 
governance weaknesses, raising doubts as to its ability to addresses the huge 
latent demand for quality higher education in the country. Third, there are 
signiﬁ  cant market failures in acquiring physical assets that are necessary 
for institutions, especially land. Fourth, regulatory approvals are extremely 
rigid with regard to infrastructure requirements (irrespective of costs or lo-
cation) and an insistence on academic conformity to centrally mandated 
course outlines, degree structures, and admissions policies. Fifth, a key ele-
ment of a well functioning market—competition—is distorted by not allow-
ing foreign universities to set up campuses in India, limiting benchmarking 
to global standards. Sixth, the central element of a well- functioning market, 
informational transparency, is woefully inadequate.
A third reason—and the most important—lies in the key cleavages and 
drivers of India politics. The contention of a former cabinet minister respon-
sible for higher education, that “inclusion and access with equity are the core 
issues that confront us today [in higher education],” is noteworthy in that the 
absence of excellence or the abysmal quality of governance that has made 
the pursuit of excellence so diﬃcult are simply not deemed as core issues.15 
While higher education is a prime casualty of the populism and fragmenta-
tion of the Indian polity, the underlying reason is that it has become a key 
battleground of distributional conﬂ  icts (and not just in India). The main 
reason is rising skill premia. While this is a global phenomenon—the last 
two decades have seen a signiﬁ  cant increase in the skill premium in both 
industrialized and developing countries—it is more puzzling in develop-
ing countries. Despite numerous problems that aﬄict the measurement of 
skill premia, Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007) argue that because virtually all 
country studies show large skill premium increases, “it is unlikely that they 
13. Report of The Committee to Advise on Renovation and Rejuvenation of Higher Educa-
tion, June 2009.
14. The discussion in this paragraph draws from Kapur and Mehta (2008).
15.  http:/ / inhome.rediﬀ.com/ news/ 2007/ oct/ 10arjun.htm.318    Devesh  Kapur
are all a ﬁ  gment of the measurement problems,” although the exact magni-
tudes may be aﬀected by these measurement problems.16 In India, the skill 
premium (as measured by the return to a university degree) has increased by 
13 percent (relative to primary education) between 1987 and 1999 (Kijima 
2006) and 25 percent between 1998 and 2004 (Dutta 2006; OECD 2007).
With identity politics emerging as the principal fulcrum of political com-
petition in India, debates on aﬃrmative action (or “reservations” as it is 
known in India) as the means to increase the representation of socially mar-
ginalized groups have been so contentious as to overwhelm virtually every 
other issue in Indian higher education. While the framers of India’s consti-
tution were deeply concerned with the ideals of social justice and equality, 
these progressive ideas ran contrary to the pervasive and deep- rooted social 
hierarchy and severe discrimination deeply imbedded in India’s caste system. 
In order to redress centuries of discrimination against India’s lowest castes 
(so-  called untouchables, or Dalits as they are now known) and indigenous 
peoples, the Indian constitution enshrined the most comprehensive system 
of compensatory discrimination for these groups known as “reservations.” 
Seats in federal and state legislatures and jobs in civil services and state-
  owned enterprises were reserved in proportion to their share in the popu-
lation. The same was the case in public higher education institutions (except 
in those run by minorities).17
But like the infant-  industry argument, aﬃrmative action programs tend 
to take on a life of their own, as more and more groups press their claims 
to avail of its beneﬁ  ts. The Indian constitution contains a clause allowing 
the federal and state governments to make “any special provision for the 
advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens 
or for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes” (Constitution of India, 
Article 15, clause 4). Over time, the expansiveness and ambiguity of the 
clause “any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens” opened 
up a Pandora’s Box and became a favorite hunting ground for political 
populism. While aﬃrmative action has had some success (albeit modest) in 
reducing intergroup inequality, it has tended to amplify intragroup inequali-
ties. Broad social categories like “Scheduled Castes,” “Scheduled Tribes,” 
and “Other Backward Castes” tend to gloss over the fact that these are 
themselves extremely heterogenous categories with hierarchies within them. 
Consequently, the beneﬁ  ts of reservations are disproportionately garnered 
by some subgroups—those who were better oﬀ to begin with. Moreover, 
16. The skill premium increases have been largest in Mexico, where the return to university 
education (relative to primary education) increased by 68 percent between 1987 and 1993 
(Cragg and Epelbaum 1996). In Latin America, a worker with six years of education earns on 
average 50 percent more than someone who has not attended school, a high school graduate 
earns 120 percent more, and someone with a university diploma earns on average 200 percent 
more (World Bank and UNESCO 2000).
17. Article 15 of the Indian Constitution prohibits discrimination, based on religion, race, 
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while the creation of educated elites from these social groups is indicative 
of some success, their children beneﬁ  t much more than the vast majority 
in the group who, given the limited number of seats, are crowded out. This 
points to one chronic weakness in these programs—the absence of nondis-
cretionary sunset clauses that allows the beneﬁ  ts of these policies to spread 
to other households within the group. Finally, perhaps the most inimical 
impact is that these policies have resulted in a political economy akin to that 
of rent- seeking. Enormous political energy and eﬀort is spent by politicians 
promising ever more beneﬁ  ts to more and more social groups rather than 
improving and expanding the quality of supply by focusing on primary and 
secondary education. The Indian supreme court has ruled that reservations 
cannot exceed 50 percent (that would violate equality guaranteed by the 
constitution), but this has been ﬂ  outed by several states setting the stage for 
a possible future constitutional crisis.
Debates on aﬃrmative action are, of course, by no means unique to India. 
There continues to be widely divergent views on the role of higher educa-
tion in society. Governments increasingly want universities to be “engines 
of social justice” on the one hand as well as “handmaidens of industry” or 
“implementers of the skills agenda” on the other. Alison Richard, Cam-
bridge University’s vice-  chancellor, has argued that while institutions such 
as hers “try to reach out to the best students, whatever their background,” 
and “one outcome of that is that we can help to promote social mobility. 
But promoting social mobility is not our core mission. Our core mission is 
to provide an outstanding education within a research setting.”18 And even 
if social mobility is an important goal, how should group rights be balanced 
against individual rights? Advocates highlight the important “role-  model” 
eﬀect of such programs for disadvantaged groups and the many positive pay 
oﬀs of diversity, while critics argue that these programs perpetuate racial 
stereotypes. How valuable is diversity in an educational environment? And 
what exactly is “diversity”? What criteria (or sunset clauses) should be used 
to phase out these programs? There is little agreement on even the most basic 
question. Under what conditions do such programs entrench identity poli-
tics or instead gradually erode them? Then there are practical questions of 
how to implement these programs. To what extent should governments use 
control or incentive mechanisms to oversee such programs? What should be 
the policy at private institutions given their growing importance? And how 
should design of such programs reﬂ  ect not just the normative aspects but the 
reality of how political considerations will impact implementation?
In 2006, in an attempt to bolster its electoral base among India’s larg-
est social group, the Congress-  led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) gov-
18. Jessica Shepard, “Cambridge Mission ‘Not Social Mobility,’” The Guardian, Septem-
ber  10,  2008,  http:/ / www.guardian.co.uk/ education/ 2008/ sep/ 10/ accesstouniversity.higher
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ernment extended reservation beneﬁ  ts to the “Other Backward Castes” 
(OBCs) in educational institutions run by the federal government. There 
are ongoing disputes about statistical data used by the government of India 
and Indian states for oﬀering reservation beneﬁ  ts to these groups, especially 
because the possibility of entitlements has led to more and more social 
groups to claim they are more backward than the others.19 Sundaram (2007) 
argues that representation of a social group can only be judged by a com-
parison of its share in enrollments in a given level of education with its share 
in the population eligible for entry into that level of education rather than 
the population as a whole. By this criterion, India’s OBCs (and, especially, 
for over 70 percent of them who are above the poverty line), the extent of 
underrepresentation of the OBCs in enrollments in Indian universities is less 
than 5 percent. Aﬃrmative action programs that are based on identity rather 
than income or poverty, for a social group such as India’s OBCs whose social 
and economic conditions reﬂ  ect the average in the country, risk the better 
oﬀ within the group monopolizing all the privileges, with little beneﬁ  t to the 
vast majority in that group.
Another analysis (Basant and Sen 2009) also conﬁ  rms that the under-
representation of socially marginalized groups in higher education is much 
less once the likelihood of completion of high school is taken into account. 
The likelihood of undertaking higher education increases dramatically for 
the marginalized groups after they cross the threshold of school education. 
This increase is particularly the case for women and in rural areas. Table 9.6 
lays out the degree of under-   or overrepresentation across socioreligious 
groups. All socioreligious groups except upper caste Hindus and “other 
minorities” are underrepresented. However, this declines once ﬂ  ow (rather 
than stock) measures are considered (suggesting improvements over time) 
and decline signiﬁ  cantly when we compare across only the eligible popula-
tion, that is, those who have completed high school. Take, for example, the 
OBC group that will now beneﬁ  t from reservation in higher education. Of 
the total population in the age group seventeen to twenty-nine, this group 
has a share of about 34.5 percent; the group’s share in the eligible population 
in this age group is 30.1 percent, while their share in the currently studying 
population is 28.2 percent.
19. As India’s Supreme Court has observed, “The paradox of the system of reservation is that 
it has engendered a spirit of self-  denigration among the people. Nowhere else in the world do 
castes, classes or communities queue up for the sake of gaining the backward status. Nowhere 
else in the world is there competition to assert backwardness and to claim ‘we are more back-
ward than you.’ This is an unhappy and disquieting situation, but it is stark reality. Whatever 
gloss one may like to put upon it, it is clear from the rival claims in these appeals and writ peti-
tions that the real contest here is between certain members of two premier (population-  wise) 
caste community classes . . . each claiming that the other is not a socially and educationally 
backward class and each keen to be included in the list of socially and educationally backward 
classes.” Justice O. Chinnappa Reddy in K.C. Vasanth Kumar v. State of Karnataka (1985) 
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If the problem of access is less acute than warranted by recent populist 
measures, the performance of “reserved” candidates compared to the rest 
raises further questions on the limits of this strategy. It is not just that res-
ervations at elite educational institutions beneﬁ  t at best a tiny minority of 
candidates from socially marginalized groups. The evidence is also strongly 
suggestive that admission alone will be insuﬃcient to equalize career out-
comes even for this tiny minority in the absence of better school- level oppor-
tunities. Chakravarty and Somanathan (2008) use data from one of India’s 
most elite institutions (Indian Institute of Management [IIM]- Ahmedabad) 
and ﬁ  nd that that graduates who came through aﬃrmative action (Sched-
uled Caste [SC] or Scheduled Tribe [ST] or SC/  ST) get signiﬁ  cantly lower 
wages (between a ﬁ  fth and a third) than those admitted in the general cat-
egory. However, this diﬀerence disappears once they account for lower grade 
point averages of SC/  ST candidates, suggesting that the wage diﬀerences 
could be due to the weaker (on average) academic performance of SC/  ST 
candidates.20 This appears to be the result of poor quality of schooling prior 
to entering higher education rather than discrimination per se in access to 
higher education (which in any case in India is almost entirely based on 
standardized exam scores, such as state wide high school exam results or 
nationwide standardized entrance tests). Nonetheless, all major actors, be 
they politicians, courts, media, and even many academics, have focused on 
access issues in higher education.
9.5      The Evolution of a Surrogate Higher Education System
There is little doubt that the Indian university system is in deep crisis. 
Given its well documented travails, its limited impact on India’s growth 
needs some explanation. If the traditional university system is doing such 
a poor job, how have Indian ﬁ  rms addressed their human capital needs in 
recent years? Sectors such as IT have been growing at a scorching pace. 
From a few million dollars in the mid-  1980s, its revenues crossed 70 billion 
dollars for FY2008 to 2009. More recently, the life-  sciences sector (biotech 
and pharmaceutical) industry has also been growing rapidly, with revenues 
of nearly $25 billion in 2007.
Of course it could be argued that a better higher education system would 
have resulted in even higher growth rates or that the poor quality has 
imposed economic costs. Large increases in wage premia at the top end of 
India’s talent pool imply that supply of quality talent simply has not kept up 
with the demand. Other costs may not be visible as yet—they may be more 
long term or their negative eﬀects may be more social and political rather 
20. They also ﬁ  nd that (at least in this case) controlling for work experience and grades, there 
is no wage penalty to being female, and unlike studies from U.S. and British labor markets, there 
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than economic. While I will return to this issue in the conclusion, here it is 
suﬃcient to discuss why the travails of Indian universities have not had a 
more inimical impact on Indian ﬁ  rms. I argue that just as Indian ﬁ  rms have 
been forced to adapt to chronic weaknesses in infrastructure, labor laws, 
and so on, they have also adapted to the weaknesses of the Indian university 
system. A surrogate higher education system has evolved and, in particular, 
workforce skill development is occurring outside the traditional domestic 
university model—within ﬁ  rms, by commercial providers, overseas, through 
open-  source or virtual learning, and in narrow specialized institutions, the 
so- called  deemed- to- be  universities.
9.5.1      Skill Development by Firms
The private sector has long contributed to higher education through four 
key mechanisms: directly funding research (indeed, in Japan, doctorates 
called ronbun hakase, were awarded by universities to dissertations that were 
written by researchers working solely in ﬁ  rms, with appropriate company 
personnel serving as advisers instead of university professors); private phi-
lanthropy supporting gifts and endowments; working with weak public in-
stitutions to improve the quality of instructional material and infrastructure; 
and, most important, through so-  called corporate universities—in-  house 
company training and development initiatives. These have been around since 
the nineteenth century, when large companies such as DuPont and General 
Electric introduced “corporate classrooms” to provide additional training 
for employees.
In most market economies, the direct and indirect training costs incurred 
by the private sector make it the largest provider of professional training. 
Corporations often have greater access to resources than do public univer-
sities and oﬀer training in functional skills and new technologies that may 
not be otherwise available. Although most of these institutions serve only 
company employees, some corporate universities are opening their programs 
to fee-  paying students or launching subsidiary for-  proﬁ  t universities.
Recently the new multinational corporations (MNCs) from emerging 
markets have become innovators in this area, having to compensate for the 
weakness of the higher education systems in their countries by developing 
ambitious in-  house programs. In principle, there are many beneﬁ  ts when 
ﬁ  rms organize and pay for the labor market skills they need. Indeed all 
ﬁ  rms do that to some extent—in most cases relying on some variant of 
an apprenticeship system. However, developing countries have few large 
ﬁ  rms that can internalize the costs of these training universities. Moreover, 
as labor markets become more ﬂ  exible, the greater turnover of employees 
reduces the incentives for in-  house universities because the beneﬁ  ts of such 
training are not fully internalized.
Nonetheless, as Wadhwa, Kim De Vitton, and Gereﬃ (2008) argue, with 
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Indian industry has addressed this handicap by investing heaving in provid-
ing the necessary workplace training and development of their employees. 
An array of workforce skill development practices including new employee 
training, continual training, hiring managers from within the company, 
advanced performance appraisal systems, and investing in education by 
partnering with universities have all gone a long way in improving the skills 
of their workforce.
The private sector has also become involved in creating “corporate uni-
versities” to try and ﬁ  ll the gap between the skills required for employ-
ment and those produced by traditional universities. The most organized 
eﬀort in this regard has been by the IT industry, whose rapid expansion 
has led to growing skill shortages.21 Industry leaders, Infosys, Tata Con-
sultancy Services (TCS), and Wipro, have all set up large campuses and 
training programs and are also working collectively through the industry 
body, NASSCOM, to improve pedagogy and training in Indian engineering 
schools. Infosys has set up a $450 million facility capable of training 18,000 
fresh graduates annually at a cost of about $5,000 per student. Each of the 
candidates recruited by the software company has to spend eight hours a 
day at a residential company campus studying software programming and 
attending team- building workshops. In order to graduate, every trainee has 
to pass two three-  hour-  long comprehensive exams.22 Similarly, the Wipro 
Academy of Software Engineering recruits and trains about 14,000 annually. 
It screens science graduates and trains them in a four-  year program with a 
well-  known private engineering school (Birla Institute of Technology and 
Science [BITS]-  Pilani), at the end of which they graduate with a master’s in 
software engineering and are employed by Wipro. Under a program called 
TCS Ignite, TCS hires science graduates from over 200 colleges in nine states 
and then puts them through an intensive seven-  month customized curricu-
lum before they are inducted as full-  time employees. The condition is that 
these candidates must agree to stay on with the company for two years.
Collectively, eﬀorts of companies like Infosys’s Campus Connect Program 
and Wipro’s Academy of Software Excellence aim to improve the qual-
ity of engineers through curriculum development and training in colleges. 
NASSCOM, the apex body representing the IT industry, has been directing 
its eﬀorts at standardized skills assessment and veriﬁ  cation program and 
improve the skills of 10,000 faculty members in 1,500 engineering colleges 
over the next three years.
The surrogate education system is extending well beyond software com-
panies. In ﬁ  nance and banking, accounting ﬁ  rm Ernst & Young, faced with 
21. See, “India’s Corporations Race to Train Workers and Avoid Being Left in the Dust,” 
India Knowledge@Wharton, September 18, 2008.
22. Infosys’s Global Education Centre (GEC) is spread over 335- acres. It has over 500 faculty 
rooms and 10,300 residential rooms in a built-  up space of 6 million square feet and is capable 
of training 13,000 students in a single sitting.Indian Higher Education    3 2 5
a severe shortage of freshly qualiﬁ  ed chartered accountants for its tax audit 
business, has opened a tax academy, which trains recruits as tax associates. 
While India’s largest public-  sector bank, State Bank of India, annually re-
cruits about 20,000 new employees (from 2.4 million applicants) and has a 
long-  established training program, new private-  sector banks are following 
suit. ICICI Bank recruits undergo a one- year residential classroom training 
at the ICICI Manipal Academy of Banking and Insurance, a joint venture 
between the bank and the private Manipal University. The bank and uni-
versity have jointly designed the course content with courses in treasury, 
international banking, and microﬁ  nance. The costs are paid by ICICI Indian 
Institute of Banking and Finance (IIBF).
Recently, even a seemingly lower skill sector, the rapidly expanding organ-
ized retail sector, has followed suit. Pantaloon (a large retail ﬁ  rm) has started 
a three-  year bachelor of business administration (BBA) program with a 
focus on retail in association with the Madurai Kamraj University. The 
Bharti Group has started the Bharti Academy of Retail Academy for In-
surance and is also setting up sixty learning centers across the country to 
oﬀer courses in insurance, telecom, and retail. Other training initiatives in 
this regard include Reliance Retail, the Future Group and Retailers Asso-
ciation of India.
Industry has also become involved in redesigning curricula. For instance, 
the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) has been putting together 
courses to improve soft skills, training the trainers for this course and to 
integrate related courses into the university curriculum. This initiative has 
been launched in the state of Tamil Nadu and will be extended to universi-
ties across other states. Firms and industry bodies, with the eﬀorts of state 
governments are all working at enhancing skill development. The CII is 
also working closely with the government and large companies in a public-
  private partnership model to upgrade the government-  owned industrial 
training institutes (ITIs) and align them more closely with the needs of 
industry.23 To address the shortage of civil engineers, Volvo Construction 
Equipment has joined hands with Visveswaraya Technological University 
(VTU) for oﬀering hands-  on industry education to postgraduate students 
of the university. Under this partnership, the university has recognized Vol-
vo’s Resource Centre for Asphalt and Soil Testing Academy as an extension 
center to oﬀer postgraduate courses in road technology.
Even public-  sector organizations such as the Department of Space, the 
Council for Scientiﬁ  c and Industrial Research (CSIR), and the Defense 
Research and Development Organization (DRDO) are seeking to address 
their diﬃculties in recruiting qualiﬁ  ed research and development (R&D) 
personnel by setting up captive “deemed universities.” For instance, the 
23. Companies that have adopted ITIs include Bosch; Hero Honda; Ashok Leyland; Larsen 
& Toubro; and Bharat Heavy Electricals, Ltd.326    Devesh  Kapur
Department of Space has set up the Indian Institute of Space Science and 
Technology, and the Department of Atomic Energy the National Insti-
tute of Science, Education, and Research. The Bhabha Atomic Energy Re-
search Center (BARC) training schools (established by the founder fathers 
of India’s atomic energy program in 1957), provided the scientiﬁ  c person-
nel for the Department of Atomic Energy for nearly a half-  century. The 
programs were modeled on the Argonne International School of Nuclear 
Science and Engineering (1955) and Oak Ridge School of Reactor Tech-
nology (1950) in the United States where many of the BARC pioneers had 
been trained. This is now being transformed into a deemed-  to-  be univer-
sity—the Homi Bhabha National Institute (HBNI). Faced with a shortage 
of trained personnel, the CSIR, a network of thirty- eight government labo-
ratories in applied research, is planning to set up a research university. This 
would allow the CSIR to impart a quality education and award degrees and 
thereby create the human capital it desperately needs.
9.5.2      Buying Higher Education Abroad
Higher education and learning has always had a strong international ﬂ  a-
vor. Where political constraints make any change unfeasible and the supply 
of higher education institutions with any signaling eﬀect is severely limited, 
there is an increasing tendency to purchase higher education overseas. Since 
the late 1990s, the number of students crossing borders to receive educa-
tion has increased by more than 50 percent. It is estimated that the number 
of students from developing countries studying abroad is likely to double 
before 2015 and double again by 2025. While China has emerged as the 
largest country of origin for international students, there has been a surge 
of students from India as well.
International student outﬂ  ows from India have been growing rapidly. In 
contrast to past decades when these outﬂ  ows were more the result of low 
pay oﬀs to skill rather than underinvestment in higher education capacity, 
with the rapid rise in skill premiums and the diﬃculties of access to qual-
ity institutions within the country, the latter has become more important. 
Data from the Indian government indicate that more than a quarter million 
Indian students were studying abroad in 2008 to 2009.24 In 1993, there were 
barely 300 Indian students in Australia. In 2008 to 2009, the ﬁ  gure crossed 
97,000. However, most of this increase has been either at the undergraduate 
level and (especially) master’s level, not at the doctoral level.25 Indeed, the 
number of S&E doctorates received by Indians in the United States peaked 
24. Of these, 104,522 were in the United States; 97,035 were in Australia; 25,905 were in the 
United Kingdom; and 6,040 were in New Zealand. Figures are from a report of the Ministry 
of Overseas Indian Aﬀairs cited in “Desi Students Are Latest Globe Trotters,” Sunday Times 
of India, Bangalore, July 26, 2009, p 7.
25. More than 70 percent of Indian students in the United States were in graduate programs, 
IIE Open Doors 2007.Indian Higher Education    3 2 7
in the late 1990s (around 1,300 annually) and subsequently declined to about 
800 annually between 2001 to 2003.
Until about the mid-  1960s, Indians who went abroad for higher educa-
tion tended to return. And when they did, the reentry vehicle was generally 
the public sector. From the mid-  1960s to the end of the millennium, return 
rates fell sharply, especially for those with advanced degrees. The pendulum 
has again begun to swing back, but with one key diﬀerence: the reentry of 
Indians with advanced degrees is now almost entirely to the private sec-
tor (especially the growing number of MNC R&D labs), with few joining 
public- sector research institutions. In the latter case, many researchers have 
postdoctoral experience abroad, rather than doctoral degrees (this is espe-
cially true of the biological sciences).
While there are many gains from these outﬂ  ows, there are two signiﬁ  cant 
costs. One, a large number of students, especially those engaged in research, 
do not return. Despite the increasing attractiveness of India, the percentage 
of Indians obtaining PhDs in S&E who had “deﬁ  nite plans to stay” in the 
United States increased from 56.3 percent in 1994 to 1997 to 62.7 percent 
in 2002 to 2005, even as the number of Indians obtaining PhDs in S&E de-
clined by 30 percent (from 5,014 to 3,587). And two, students (and parents) 
incur very large expenditures, which are almost the same as the total higher 
education expenditures in the country—for a tiny fraction of the number 
of students in the country. While public higher education spending in India 
was about $4.5 billion in 2006 to 2007, Indians were spending nearly $3.5 
billion buying higher education overseas (Kapur and Mehta 2008).
Although the number of students from developing countries seeking edu-
cation abroad has sharply increased in recent years, the phenomenon itself 
is not new. What is newer, however, is the reverse: foreign higher education 
institutions, establishing programs in developing countries under a variety 
of arrangements ranging from cross-  border franchised agreements, twin-
ning agreements, joint programs, validation programs, subcontracting, and 
distance learning activities.26 For example, the growing demand for nurses 
in India (and abroad) has led to a burgeoning number of private nursing 
schools. Although these are accredited by the Indian Council of Nursing, 
this carries little signaling value. Recently, a group of private nursing schools 
in India approached the Commission on Graduates of Foreign Nursing 
Schools (CGFNS), a statutory U.S. body, to create a set of standards that 
could become an imprimatur and have a distinct signaling value.27 The 
importance of external validation mechanisms is likely to increase.
26. Under twinning arrangements, after initial training in their home country, students 
relocate overseas to receive their ﬁ  nal training and degree from the foreign university. Under 
franchising programs, the entire program takes place in the home country, with the foreign 
institution providing curricula and assessment and certifying the program with the university 
crest on the degree.
27. Interview with Barbara Nichols, CEO, CGFNS, Cambridge, September 27, 2008.328    Devesh  Kapur
The other alternative, attracting foreign higher education providers to 
India, has faced strong resistance. There is no dearth of critics who fear the 
entry eﬀects of foreign providers of higher education. Some fear that foreign 
providers—by importing curricula with little consideration of local tradi-
tions and culture—might prove to be Trojan horses of cultural imperial-
ism. Others argue that foreign providers arguably undermine the sovereignty 
of the state, especially in its capacity to regulate education and its nation-
  building functions. A third concern is that because transnational educa-
tion is aimed primarily at upper socioeconomic groups, foreign providers 
may simply engage in “cream-  skimming,” exacerbating inequities in access 
to tertiary education. A fourth concern is of an internal “brain-  drain”—
wage diﬀerentials between faculty at public and private (foreign) institutions 
would result in public universities stripped of their most talented teachers.
These concerns must be juxtaposed against a reasonable counterfactual. 
It is not as if the current “closed” system higher education system has either 
sharply reduced social inequality or brought about exemplary “nation-
  building.” If the choice is between students going overseas and spending 
money there or spending it mainly at home, the latter is surely a less-  worse 
option. Indeed, a policy of allowing any university ranked in the world’s 
top 1,000 could only improve Indian higher education given the handful of 
Indian universities that make the grade, as noted earlier.
But India’s political economy has made liberalization in this sector ex-
ceedingly diﬃcult. However, the return of the Congress party led government 
in 2009 with a stronger mandate, and the weakening of the left parties led 
to renewed hopes that a policy change would occur. Such a change would 
require the government to pass a bill in parliament that could only occur 
if it ensured a level playing ﬁ  eld between foreign and domestic suppliers 
with regard to the sensitive issue of social obligations, namely aﬃrmative 
action. This would make it very unlikely that reputed foreign universities 
would enter India, at least at the undergraduate level. The few that might 
will conﬁ  ne their activities to graduate, specialized degrees.
9.5.3    Virtual  Education
Technology is driving another mechanism of availing of higher educa-
tion—virtual education. Distance learning is not a new phenomenon in 
developing countries—students have enrolled in correspondence courses 
for decades, especially in teacher training programs.28 But these classes had 
little interaction between faculty and students and were plagued by high 
dropout rates. However, signiﬁ  cant improvements in technology in the past 
28. In 1996, all of the ﬁ  ve largest distance- learning programs were based in lower-  or middle-
  income countries (World Bank and UNESCO 2000). These include Anadolu University in 
Turkey, founded in 1982; China TV University, founded in 1979; Universitas Terbuka, Indo-
nesia, founded in 1984; Indira Gandhi National Open University (IGNOU), India, founded in 
1985; Sukhothai Thammathirat Open University, Thailand, founded in 1978.Indian Higher Education    3 2 9
decade have transformed these programs, drastically increasing their size and 
scope. Despite skepticism on numerous fronts, especially perceived weak-
nesses on key components of quality education—discussion, collaboration, 
and reasoning skills—virtual education has been increasing rapidly. There 
has been a dramatic expansion of resources available online, speciﬁ  cally 
through the use of “open courseware,” in which high quality “open knowl-
edge” materials, including course content, library collections, and research 
data is being made available online. In 2006, more than 100 higher education 
institutions and associated organizations from around the world launched 
the Open Courseware Consortium, each pledging to place course materials 
for at least ten courses online for free.29 By reducing constraints on access to 
quality content and instruction at low cost, virtual education has much prom-
ise. Nonetheless, making these resources available online does not solve the 
problem of access for the less privileged without addressing the availability 
of aﬀordable Internet access, which continues to be a critical impediment.
The principal driver of virtual education in India has been the Indira 
Gandhi National Open University (with more than 1.8 million students). 
Despite the brouhaha about India’s IT prowess, until recently there were 
only limited attempts at leveraging its potential for virtual education. How-
ever, a recent joint venture funded by the Indian government that includes 
all Indian institutes of technology (IITs) and the Indian Institute of Science 
(IISc), called the National Programme on Technology Enhanced Learning 
(NPTEL), aims to enhance the quality of engineering education in the coun-
try by developing curriculum- based video and Web courses. Dissemination 
is through an agreement with Google and YouTube. The NPTEL YouTube 
channel covering the courses hosts about seventy- four courses currently and 
has had more than 1.3 million visitors. However, the didactic importance of 
this mechanism is unclear as yet.
A major handicap is that 80 percent of India’s Internet connections are 
in the country’s twelve largest cities (which account for about one-  tenth of 
the population). To address this issue, the Indian government launched a 
new $1 billion initiative in 2009—National Mission in Education through 
Information and Communication Technology—to provide content genera-
tion, connectivity, and computing infrastructure to all higher educational 
institutions across the country.
9.6    Conclusion
The paper has argued that while there has been a substantial growth in 
higher education in India, whether measured by the number of students or 
29. Other examples include Connexions, the Open University in the United Kingdom, and 
CMU’s Open Learning Initiative. They oﬀer some advantages in that they are speciﬁ  cally 
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expenditures (especially private), serious governance issues have hobbled the 
Indian university system. To the extent the Indian system has succeeded, it is 
largely the result of Darwinian selection mechanisms. The formal labor mar-
ket invariably selects from such an enormous pool, with selection ratios often 
less than 1 percent, with the assumption that those selected may have limited 
skills but have the attributes to be trainable. A parallel surrogate higher educa-
tion system has, however, evolved to impart job-  related skills that are more 
akin to vocational education rather than a conventional university system.
In June 2009, a committee set up by the Indian government a year earlier 
submitted its report.30 The report was a severe indictment of the Indian 
higher education system and largely corroborates many of the weaknesses 
emphasized in this paper. It called for sweeping changes to the regulatory 
system, abolishing the plethora of regulatory bodies and replacing them by 
a single body: a Commission for Higher Education and Research (CHER). 
In order to shield the new regulator against political pressures, the report 
emphasized that this commission be established through a constitutional 
amendment and have a constitutional status. It also highlighted the dangers 
of the growth of specialized institutions of higher education in the coun-
try at the cost of broad-  based universities, short-  changing the possibilities 
of a broad-  based undergraduate education and cross-  fertilization of ideas 
across disciplines. At the time of writing this paper, however, it was unclear 
if the Indian government would adopt the roadmap for reforms suggested 
by this commission or put into place some other ideas.
In addition, this paper also raises fundamental questions about just what 
we mean about higher education and the purposes it serves. Beyond selec-
tion, it is unclear what is the value added by higher education in India. 
It is entirely possible that the limited numbers of good higher education 
institutions beneﬁ  t the few who have access to them and crowd out from 
labor markets others with similar ability but who lack access. Furthermore, 
with formal educational qualiﬁ  cations becoming more prevalent, the pres-
sures to get credentialed are mounting, without the corresponding skills 
and training. However, just as an arms race does not lead to greater security 
despite much greater spending, the upward spiral in education credentialing 
in India, as elsewhere, may not yield social beneﬁ  ts commensurate to the 
expenditure (e.g., Wolf 2004; Murray 2008).
The success of the evolving surrogate education system has (at least now) 
depended mainly on drastic selection mechanisms and the ability to pay 
private providers. But for the vast majority of graduates with worthless 
degrees, who are not selected into these training programs and left to the 
30. Government of India, Report of the Committee to Advise on Renovation and Rejuvenation 
of Higher Education, June 2009. The report is also known as the Yash Pal Committee report 
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vagaries of the informal sector, the risk of being locked into low productivity 
occupations is very real. The rapid increase in the number of credentialed 
but poorly educated young people posed signiﬁ  cant political challenges for 
India in the 1970s at a time of economic stagnation. In an era of rapid 
growth these dangers are less apparent—but the sharp increase in their num-
bers and expectations, coupled with weak formal job market prospects for 
the majority of India’s graduates, may well come back to haunt the country 
if its growth falters.
Even otherwise success in labor markets does not imply success in knowl-
edge creation. India’s knowledge needs in areas with large public goods pay 
oﬀs, in social sciences and a host of basic sciences, be it climate change, 
health economics, infectious diseases, or agricultural technologies, have been 
woefully neglected. The Achilles heel of the system is that higher education 
in India has become so completely focused on professional education that 
the less instrumental aspects of higher education—research and training 
in the “liberal arts” and “pure” sciences—have atrophied signiﬁ  cantly.31 It 
is hard to gauge the long-  term eﬀects of this decline because there is little 
agreement on even the most fundamental question about higher education: 
what is the purpose of higher education? To train people for a labor force or 
train a labor force that is, in turn, trainable by employers? To create a middle 
class? Be an engine of innovation? Provide a ladder for social mobility or 
create national elites? To inﬂ  uence and mold the minds of young people? If 
the answer is “all of the above” (however weakly), the prognosis may be less 
bright than currently thought.
Given the enormous pool of young people in India, the future of India’s 
higher education system will have considerable eﬀects on the U.S. higher 
education system given that students from India constitute the largest num-
ber of foreign students in the United States. In the foreseeable future, at 
least that demand will remain, given the growing cohort of India students 
and the weaknesses of the Indian higher education system. However, the 
more noticeable change is likely to come when India modiﬁ  es its policies to 
attract foreign universities and a new generation of Indian higher education 
institutions gets established. During the 1950s and 1960s, the collabora-
tion between U.S. and Indian institutions established some of India’s lead-
ing higher education institutions (see box 9.1). While those arrangements 
will not be precisely replicated, there are likely to be growing linkages be-
tween the large number of new central government as well as private insti-
tutions that are being set up and U.S.-  based institutions on faculty train-
ing and exchanges, pedagogy, collaborative research programs, and student 
31. For a view on India’s attempts at improving science education, see Shobo Bhattacharya, 
“India’s Education Experiment in Basic Sciences: The IISER Solution,” India in Transition, 
January  7,  2009,  http:/ / casi.ssc.upenn.edu/ iit/ Bhattacharya.Box 9.1  Examples of successful United States-  India 
collaborations in higher education
Successful collaborations between the United States and India have 
a left a strong legacy, not just for India but for the United States 
as well. The Indian Institute of Technology, Kanpur, established in 
1959, beneﬁ  ted in its ﬁ  rst decade from the Kanpur Indo-  American 
Programme, where a consortium of nine U.S. universities (Massachu-
setts Institute of Technology [MIT]; University of California, Berke-
ley; California Institute of Technology; Princeton University; Car-
negie Institute of Technology; University of Michigan; Ohio State 
University; Case Institute of Technology; and Purdue University) 
helped set up the research laboratories and academic programs. The 
Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad established in 1961, 
collaborated with Kellogg School, Wharton School, and Harvard 
Business School in its initial years, while Indian Institute of Manage-
ment, Calcutta, was developed in collaboration with MIT’s Sloan 
School of Management and the Ford Foundation. Faculty training 
and program design were the key elements in these collaborations.
A less heralded, but equally successful collaboration, was the U.S. 
role in developing Indian agriculture higher education institutions. 
During the 1960s and 1970s, the Ford Foundation ﬁ  nanced a large- 
scale extension build up, the Rockefeller Foundation helped strengthen 
agricultural research, and the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) helped conceptualize and ﬁ  nance a new in-
stitutional innovation—state agricultural universities. Because of the 
lack of knowledge about U.S. institutions, the Rockefeller Founda-
tion awarded ninety short-  term travel grants to Indian scientists and 
teachers to visit agricultural colleges and experiment stations in the 
United States between 1959 and the early 1970s, while resisting pres-
sures to invest in university buildings and equipment.
In the 1950s, an Indian delegation visited the United States. Im-
pressed by the contribution of the land grant universities, it recom-
mended the establishment of at least one state agricultural university 
(SAU) per state. In 1960, India decided to create SAUs that were di-
rectly responsible to the states and outside the control of the Ministry 
of Education. The USAID provided funding for ﬁ  ve American uni-
versities to enter into partnerships with nine of the newly established 
SAUs. The ﬁ  ve American universities supplied 300 professors on as-
signments of two or more years to these nine Indian universities. An 
Agricultural Universities Commission was established in 1960. The 
Indian government invited the Rockefeller Foundation to help to Indian Higher Education    3 3 3
exchanges. In   addition, programmatic research in global goods, such as 
sustainable agriculture, climate change, energy, transport, tropical diseases, 
and water, are likely to grow as well. India will represent one of the biggest 
overseas opportunities for U.S. higher education well into the future.
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